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The use of carbon-intense fuels by the power sector 
contributes significantly to the greenhouse gas emissions 
of most countries. For this reason, the sector is often 
key to initial efforts to regulate emissions. But how long 
does it take before new regulatory incentives result in a 
switch to less carbon intense fuels? This study examines 
fuel switching in electricity production following 
the introduction of the European Union’s Emissions 
Trading System, a cap-and-trade regulatory framework 
for greenhouse gas emissions. The empirical analysis 
examines the demand for carbon permits, carbon based 
fuels, and carbon-free energy for 12 European countries 
using monthly data on fuel use, prices, and electricity 
generation. A short-run restricted cost function is 
estimated in which carbon permits, high-carbon fuels, 
and low-carbon fuels are variable inputs, conditional 
on quasi-fixed carbon-free energy production from 
nuclear, hydro, and renewable energy capacity. The 
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a larger effort in the department to understand how climate change policies affect energy markets. Policy Research Working 
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results indicate that prices for permits and fuels affect the 
composition of inputs in a statistically significant way. 
Even so, the analysis suggests that the industry’s fuel-
switching capabilities are limited in the short run as is the 
scope for introducing new technologies. This is because 
of the dominant role that past irreversible investments 
play in determining power-generating capacity. Moreover, 
the results suggest that, because the capacity for fuel 
substitution is limited, the impact of carbon emission 
limits on electricity prices can be significant if fuel 
prices increase together with carbon permit prices. 
The estimates suggest that for every 10 percent rise in 
carbon and fuel prices, the marginal cost of electric 
power generation increases by 8 percent in the short run. 
The European experience points to the importance of 
starting early down a low-carbon path and of policies 
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Substitution and Technological Change under Carbon Cap and Trade: 
Lessons from Europe 
 
1. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) has pioneered the development of a carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 
trading program, known as the Emissions Trading System (ETS). Operating since early 2005, the 
program mandates an overall limit or cap on carbon emissions that originate from large industrial 
facilities and electric power generating plants and allows the trading of emission permits under the 
cap. By allocating a supply of permits and creating a regulatory demand for CO2, the EU ETS 
creates a market for disposing carbon dioxide emissions in the atmosphere.  As a consequence, 
markets have developed that price CO2 emissions.  
Under the legal and regulatory framework established by the EU ETS, producers of carbon 
intensive goods and services covered by the program must consider emissions in their production 
decisions, weighing the costs of purchasing permits with the benefits of selling excess permits that 
are created by using less carbon-intensive inputs or by investing in less carbon-intensive 
technologies. The objective of this study is to understand this process and the nature of short-run 
relationships among permit use, input substitution and technological change under carbon cap and 
trade.  
In pursuit of this goal, the study specifies and estimates an econometric model of fuel 
substitution in electric power production in Europe. According to Ellerman and Buchner (2007), the 
electric power sector accounts for 60 percent of carbon emissions in the EU and constitutes 90 
percent of the potential demand and 50 percent of total supply of carbon allowances.  
Electric power producers have a variety of options to reduce their carbon emissions. In the 
short-run, they can shift their mix of generation, raising their utilization of carbon-free capacity, such   3 
as nuclear power, shifting to lower carbon sources, such as natural gas fired generation, and reducing 
their use of high carbon sources, such as coal and oil-fired generation. This fuel switching is limited 
by installed capacity. Longer term, electricity producers can invest in new capacity, such as advanced 
nuclear plants, coal with carbon capture and sequestration systems, or renewable sources, including 
wind, solar, biomass, and geothermal capacity.  
Dynamically, decisions to invest in new capacity will be influenced in part by the ability of the 
existing fleet of generating plants to adapt to carbon emission constraints.  As carbon emission 
limits become more stringent, the ability of electric power producers to adjust becomes more 
difficult and the marginal cost of electricity rises, inducing new investment in carbon-free sources of 
electricity. How readily electricity produces respond to price signals remains a key question in 
estimating the costs of carbon emission controls. 
The model presented below is designed to estimate this short-run adaptability arising from 
input substitution and technological change in the electric power sector. The framework uses a 
restricted cost function in which electricity producers minimize the variable costs of production 
including inputs of coal, natural gas, petroleum, and carbon allowances subject to inputs of carbon-
free energy resources, including nuclear and renewable resources. These last two energy resources 
are treated as quasi-fixed inputs because data on prices for carbon-free energy resources are 
unavailable. This is the same problem faced by Halvorsen and Smith (1986) in their analysis of 
substitution possibilities for internally produced and un-priced ore inputs in metal mining and has 
implications for how we interpret our results. We return to this topic later in the paper. 
Unlike the Halversen and Smith study, which used a translog (TL) function, the model 
presented below is based upon the Generalized Leontief (GL) restricted cost function developed by 
Morrison (1988). Caves and Christenson (1980) show that the GL outperforms the TL when 
technology has limited substitution, which is likely in electric power generation. Morrison also shows  
  4 
that the GL allows closed form solutions for equilibrium levels of quasi-fixed inputs, which 
facilitates computation of substitution elasticities and their standard errors.  
The model is estimated using a panel of monthly time series observations from January 2005 
through March of 2008 for a cross section of twelve European countries. The relatively large 
number of observations and considerable variation in the data allows the estimation of variable 
returns to scale and input biases from technological change. For our purposes, an important 
advantage is that the model can be used to test whether the carbon cap-and-trade regime induced 
carbon saving technological innovation. Moreover, the study provides explicit measures of the 
degree of carbon abatement, such as carbon emissions per unit of electricity output, under the EU 
ETS and, most importantly, explains how this abatement was achieved. 
Specifically, the degree and nature of fuel switching induced by carbon pricing and relative fuel 
prices is estimated. This empirical assessment of carbon substitution possibilities sheds light on 
whether carbon pricing significantly increases the demand for less carbon intensive fuels, such as 
natural gas, at the expense of carbon intensive fuels, such as coal. These substitution possibilities 
ultimately determine whether the demand for carbon is price inelastic, which would imply significant 
adjustment costs to a low carbon society, or whether carbon demand is elastic, facilitating a less 
costly path to achieving significant reductions in carbon emissions.  
The next section provides some additional background on the European program. Section 3 
presents the economic framework, discussing the theoretical underpinnings for the empirical model. 
The parametric specification of the econometric model is then presented in the fourth section along 
with a discussion of the estimation techniques. Section 5 provides an overview of the data sample, 
including descriptive statistics by country on electricity generation by type, net imports, total 
generation, and the composition of so-called combustible fuels, including natural gas, coal, and 
petroleum. Trends in the carbon intensity of electricity and in fuel shares in the sample are also 
identified and discussed. The sixth section of the paper discusses the econometric results and the   5 
implications for assessing substitution and technological innovation under carbon cap and trade. 
The final section summarizes the major findings and discusses the policy implications of the results. 
2. EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
In 2003, the European Council and Parliament approved legislation that eventually launched the EU 
ETS in 2005. The ETS is a cap-and-trade program that limits carbon dioxide emissions from more 
than 10,000 installations located in the thirty member states of the European Economic Area.1 
Currently, the sectors covered by the program include energy activities (e.g. electric-power 
generation greater than 20 megawatts), ferrous metals industries (iron and steel), mineral industries 
(cement, glass, ceramics, oil refineries, etc.), and pulp and paper industries.2
As discussed, under the program regulated installations are issued permits, called EU allowances 
(EUAs), equivalent to one ton of emitted carbon dioxide. The allocations are made in accordance 
with National Allocation Plan (NAP), drawn-up by individual Member States. At the end of each 
  The program is 
considered a key element in the European Union’s plan to meet its commitment under the Kyoto 
Protocol to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 6 percent compared to 1990 levels by the end of 
2012.  
Our study period, January 2005 to March 2008, covers two phases of the program. Practical 
implementation of the program meant establishing an extensive system of procedures for allocating 
allowances, for monitoring how they are used, and for matching allowances with measured 
emissions. For this reason, Phase 1 (2005-2007) of the cap-and-trade program was intended in part 
as an opportunity to work out operational difficulties in advance of Phase 2 of the program, which 
corresponds to the first round of commitments (2008-2012) under the Kyoto Protocol.  
                                                 
1 The area includes the EU’s 27 member states, plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and. Norway 
2 For more information on the EU ETS see Watanabe and Robinson (2005), Convery and Redmond (2007) and 
Europa (2007).  
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year, regulated installations must surrender allowances equivalent to their emissions. Surplus and 
short-falls can be matched through sales and purchases. The allowances are tracked in national 
registries that were linked to form a system-wide registry during the program’s second phase. 
Though restrictions apply, the system is open to other tradable units established under the 
Kyoto Protocol, including Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from developing countries. This is 
significant, since it potentially links the two types of carbon offsets into a large and liquid market, 
making the findings of this study relevant for developing countries. Legislation known as the 
“Linking Directive” lays out the relationship between EUAs and the Kyoto-system tradable units.3
3. The Economic Model 
 
The output of electricity depends upon inputs of labor and maintenance, capital service flows from 
generating equipment and structures, and primary fuels. In addition, under the EU ETS producers 
of electricity are required to obtain pollution permit allowances to offset their emissions of carbon 
dioxide. Hence, the disposal of the carbon dioxide by-products of electricity generation now 
becomes a factor of production. These observations imply the following production function for 
electricity: 
  Yt = f Kt,Lt,Et,Ct ( )  (1) 
where Yt is output of electricity in period t, Kt is capital service flows, Ltis salaried and hourly 
worker services, maintenance, and non-fuel supplies, Et is an aggregate of energy inputs, and Ct  is 
carbon emissions.  
Assuming capital and labor are fixed in the short run, under duality theory the following long-
run cost function exists:  
                                                 
3 For an early assessment of the ETS, see the volume edited by Ellerman, Buchner and Carraro (2007). For more on 
carbon markets in general, see Larson et al. (2009).   7 
  TCt = C wet,wct Kt,Lt,Yt ( )+ µktKt + µltLt   (2) 
wherewetand wctare prices for energy and carbon respectively andµkt and µlt are the user costs 
corresponding with stocks of labor and capital stocks. Prices for carbon emission allowances 
represent the societal valuation of the impacts of carbon emissions on common property 
atmospheric resources implicit in the target level of allowable emissions and the corresponding 
allocation of permits. This specification is similar to the study conducted by Considine and Larson 
(2006) of sulfur dioxide pollution allowances. 
For the empirical analysis below,Kt and Ltare unobservable. To specify an empirical model, 
therefore, requires assuming the existence of a weakly separable sub-aggregate of energy and carbon 
emissions within the variable cost function.  In particular, the weakly separable model implies that 
substitution possibilities between fuels and carbon emissions are independent of substitution 
possibilities between labor and capital, which is likely a reasonable assumption within a short-run 
context. The cost minimization problem, therefore, is to minimize energy and carbon emission 
allowance costs subject to output levels. 
In the context of the model, there are three types of energy aggregates: i) primary fossil fuels, 
including coal, petroleum, and natural gas; ii) nuclear fuel and hydroelectric energy; and iii) 
renewable energy resources, including wind, solar, and geothermal energy. As discussed, while 
market prices for primary fuels are observable, those for nuclear, hydroelectric, and renewable 
energy are not. To accommodate this, the study assumes the existence of a weakly separable sub-
aggregate for primary energy and carbon emissions contingent upon levels of nuclear, hydroelectric, 
and renewable energy generation, levels of output and the state of technology. More specifically, this 
implies the following short-run restricted energy and emission allowance cost function:  
  Gt = G w1t,w2t,w3t Nt,Rt,Yt,Zt ( )  (3)  
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whereZt is an index of technological change,w1t is the price for carbon emission allowances; w2tis 
the is the price for solid and liquids fuels, such as coal and fuel oil with relatively high carbon 
content; w3t is price of natural gas with relatively low carbon content;Ntis the consumption of 
nuclear and hydroelectric energy, which is carbon-free with low operating costs; and Rt is renewable 
energy resource use, which are also carbon-free but associated with relatively higher operating costs. 
Two sets of substitution possibilities are recovered from this model. The first set provides 
estimates of first-order substitution possibilities among primary fuels and carbon allowances when 
levels of carbon-free energy are held fixed. The second set of substitution possibilities are recovered 
from the convexity conditions, t t R G N G ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ / , / , and estimate rates of substitution among carbon-
intensive primary fuels, carbon emissions, and carbon-free energy sources.  
An engineering perspective on this model can be attained by noting that the consumption of a 
primary fuel at a specific plant is equal to the heat rate, which is defined as the amount of fuel 
consumed per unit of electricity, multiplied by the level of power generation from that facility. So 
from this perspective, the short-run restricted variable cost function specified above in equation (3) 
can be viewed as a model that selects the least cost mix of plant capacity operating in any time 
period.  This model is consistent with least cost scheduling algorithms commonly employed by 
electricity companies and system operators.  
4. Econometric model 
The Generalized Leontief (GL) function developed by Morrison (1988) is best suited for this 
particular problem because Caves and Christensen (1980) found it more likely to maintain cost 
minimizing curvature conditions under limited input substitution possibilities, which is a reasonable 
prior assumption for electric power generation. Another important reason is that the GL provides a 
closed-form solution for stocks of quasi-fixed factors, which facilitates computation of long-run 
elasticities. For this study, the GL takes the following form:   9 
 
Gt = Yt
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where the  , ' , ' s s δ α  and  s ' γ  are unknown parameters, the  it ε ,  kt ε , and  bt ε  are stochastic errors.4
t x1
 The 
empirical model includes three variable inputs: high carbon fuel,  , low-carbon fuel,  t x2 , and 
carbon emissions,  t x3 . The restricted cost function is symmetric and homogeneous of degree zero in 
prices. The asymmetric way that output and technological change enter the cost function facilitates 
parametric testing of long-run constant returns to scale. 
The input demand functions for high carbon fossil fuels (petroleum and coal), low carbon fuels 
(natural gas), and carbon are equal to the derivative of (4) with respect to factor prices. These 
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4 The countries in order from one to twelve are Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Poland, Sweden, and United Kingdom.  
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The variable input-output ratios are a function of relative input prices conditional upon electricity 
production and the availability of hydroelectric, nuclear, and renewable energy resources. The full 
model includes the restricted variable cost function (4) and the three variable input demand 
equations (5).  
While the model can be estimated with full information maximum likelihood, a more robust 
procedure is estimation with Generalized Methods of Moments with country and monthly dummy 
variables and lagged values of the right-hand side variables, including those involving input prices, 
quasi-fixed factor levels, and output. 
5. An Overview of the Data Sample 
The above model is estimated with a pooled, monthly data sample across twelve countries in the EU 
from January 2002 to March 2008. The International Energy Agency (IEA) reports monthly electric 
power generation from nuclear, hydroelectric, geothermal and renewable resources and from the 
combustion of fossil fuels.  The IEA does not report the types of combustible fuels but the 
EuroStat database does report the consumption of petroleum, coal, and natural gas in electric power 
generation. The EuroStat database, however, does not report data on generation from geothermal 
and renewable electricity generation.  Given the rising importance of renewable energy in the 
generation portfolio, the more inclusive IEA data on generation is adopted in this study while the 
EuroStat data on fossil fuel use is utilized. A comparison of the generation data reported by the two 
agencies reveals the average differences are 3.2 percent. 
An overview of the generation and net imports data appears in Table 1, which reports the 
sample means.  The largest producers of electricity are Germany, France, United Kingdom and 
Spain. The mid tier includes Sweden and Poland and the other six countries have total indigenous 
production between 3,000 and 8,000 gigawatt hours. France and Germany are the largest producers 
at 47,624 and 45,666 gigawatt hours repsectively. All twelve countries in the sample produce fossil-  11 
fuel-fired electricity. Five countries do not produce nuclear electricity, including Austria, Denmark, 
Greece, Portugal, and Poland. Denmark and the Netherlands produce negligible amounts of 
hydroelectric power while France and Sweden are the largest producers of hydroelectricity. Germany 
and Spain produce rather substantial amounts of renewable electricity (see Table 1). 
An overview of coal, petroleum, and natural gas consumption in electric power generation 
appears in Table 2.  The largest coal consumers include Germany, United Kingdom, Poland, and 
Spain. The United Kingdom is the largest consumer of natural gas, Germany is second, and the 
Netherlands and Spain are significant consumers as well.  Spain consumes significant amounts of 
petroleum to generate power along with Greece, the United Kingdom, and Germany. 
Trends in the carbon intensity of indigenous electricity production are displayed in Figure 1. 
Carbon emissions are computed by multiplying fuel use by its respective carbon emission factor. 
The denominator is indigenous electricity production to reflect the shifts between combustible fuels 
and carbon-free generation such as nuclear, hydroelectric, and renewable energy resources. For the 
aggregate of the twelve countries, carbon intensity decreased from 2004 to 2005 but then increased 
very slightly from 2005 to 2007. This aggregate reflects a great deal of variability in carbon intensity 
trends among countries.  Poland has the highest carbon intensity among the twelve countries, which 
actually increased between 2005 and 2007. With the exception of Denmark, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and Greece, five countries reduced the carbon intensity of their electricity production –
Portugal, Netherlands, Spain, Austria, and Finland.  Electricity generation from renewable energy 
increased in each of these countries. Were it not for expanded use of renewable energy, Germany 
would have experienced even greater growth in the carbon intensity of their electricity production.  
France and Sweden have very low levels of carbon intensity due to their extensive use of nuclear and 
hydroelectric resources to generate electric power (see Figure 1). 
The shares of natural gas in total fossil fuel consumption by country for the four full calendar 
years 2004 to 2007 are displayed in Figure 2.  The share of natural gas for the aggregate of the twelve  
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countries increased from 33 to 36 percent from 2004 to 2007. Expanding use of gas in Greece, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden offset declines in Finland and 
Denmark and the flat trends in the other countries.  The empirical model below may shed some 
light on the role of relative fuel and carbon permit prices in these fuel share adjustments. 
Nevertheless, the shift to less carbon intensive natural gas, the increasing generation of renewable 
energy (see Figure 3), and the declining carbon intensity in several countries suggests that carbon 
dioxide emission abatement may have occurred even during the trial period for the EU ETS.  
During the first phase of the EU ETS, exchanges emerged to trade spot and futures contracts 
derived from Phase I and Phase II. Because the Phase I allowances could not be carried over into 
Phase II, future contracts based either on Phase I or Phase II allowances were independently priced. 
For a variety of reasons, evidence suggests that allowances were over-issued during Phase I. As a 
result, toward the end of the trial period in 2007, emission allowance prices fell to zero (see Figure 
4). However, when allocations for the second phase were determined, additional oversight was given 
to the European Commission and this appears to have resulted in a binding Phase II cap.  
In the short-run, fuel substitution decisions are likely linked to the relative costs of obtaining or 
selling marginal allowances and for this reason we use spot prices for carbon permits as reported by 
PointCarbon in our model. This is a reasonable proposition and can be tested in the analysis below 
by determining whether carbon prices are statistically significant in the input demand functions. 
In interpreting our results, we should point out that the pricing incentives for short-run 
substitution, which our model measures, may be different that the incentives for new investment in 
capacity. Said somewhat differently, fuel-switching and related actions are short-term tactics meant 
to minimize costs, while investments are made with an expected flow of profits in mind. Ellerman 
(2008), for one, argues that the investment decisions were guided by market valuations of traded 
Phase II allowances, as given by prices for the December 2008 futures contract also shown in Figure 
4. And while there is no clear reason to expect that such investments were brought forward into   13 
Phase I when spot prices were low, investment studies will need to reconcile the conflicting 
incentives given by the pricing of Phase I and Phase II allowances. 
Prices for natural gas, petroleum, and coal paid by electricity generators in the United Kingdom 
are directly observable on a monthly basis from the United Kingdom (2009). For the other 
countries, this study must estimate monthly prices based upon regional monthly wholesale prices 
published by Platts (2009) for various market hubs in the EU and quarterly prices published by the 
International Energy Agency (2009) that measure prices paid by end users including taxes. Quarterly 
averages are computed from the monthly data from Platts.  Next, we compute the ratio of these 
quarterly averages to the quarterly data reported by the IEA. These ratios represent the spreads 
between prices in each country and the market hub. Monthly estimates for prices in the remaining 
eleven countries result from multiplying these ratios by the monthly data from Platts. 
6. Model Estimation Results 
The above econometric model of the restricted variable cost function (4) and the three variables 
input demand functions given by (5) are estimated as a system of equations. Given that fuel and 
carbon permit prices and output could be endogenous, an instrumental variables estimator is 
needed. The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator provides for consistent parameter 
estimates and allows correction of the standard errors for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in 
the error terms. The instruments include lagged values of input prices, generation levels for nuclear, 
hydroelectric, and renewable generation, total power generation, and country and monthly dummy 
variables. The lagged instruments vary for each equation and correspond with the specific 
specification of the right-hand side variables in equations (4) and (5).  So, for example, the 
instruments for the input demand functions include square roots of lagged price ratios. This 
approach is intended to ensure that the instruments are correlated with the explanatory variables but 
remain independent of the error terms. Country and monthly dummy variables are included as 
instruments in all four equations.  
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The test of the over-identifying restrictions for the unrestricted model is 93.2 with a probability 
value of 0.51, which suggests that the model given above cannot be rejected. Only one technological 
change coefficient was significant at the 5 percent level or less and that was for natural gas, which 
indicated gas-saving technological change, most likely reflecting the steady improvements in the 
thermal efficiency of combined cycle gas turbine technology. As a result, the hypothesis of non-
neutral technological change is tested by computing a test statistic equal to the difference between 
the test statistics of the over-identifying restrictions for the unrestricted model and the restricted 
model with neutral technological change imposed via the following parameter restrictions: 
δzi = 0 ∀ i,γ yz = γ zz = γ zn = γ zr = 0.  The value of this test statistic is 9.16 with a probability value 
of 24%, indicating that the null hypothesis of neutral technological change cannot be rejected. This 
finding suggests that at least for the early stages of the EU ETS, exogenous technological change has 
not induced pervasive changes in the relative factor intensities of power generation.5
As a result, the following presentation of results will focus on the estimates for the model 
assuming neutral technological change.  In this case, the instruments involving the trend proxy for 
technological change are dropped and the model is re-estimated. The test of the over-identifying 
restrictions is 92.3 with 85 degrees of freedom and a probability value of 27.8%. As expected, the 
model with neutral technological change cannot be rejected. The parameter estimates appear in 
Table 3. Of the 36 country dummy variables, 20 have probability values that suggest less than a 5% 
chance of being zero while three have probability values less than 10%.  For the 21 coefficients on 
the relative price, output, and quasi-fixed factors, 15 have probability values less than 5 percent and 
two less than 10 percent. The coefficients involving output, however, have relatively high probability 
  
                                                 
5 The parameter estimates for the neutral technological change model are relatively close to those for the non-neutral 
model. There are no sign changes between the two sets of estimates.   15 
values, although as we shall see below the output elasticities contain the other parameters and often 
are highly significant.  
The goodness of fit statistics are reported in Table 4 indicate an excellent fit of the data with R-
squared coefficients ranging from 0.97 to 0.99.  The Durbin-Watson statistics indicate first-order 
autocorrelation, which is why we allow a first order moving average correction in the GMM 
estimation. An explicit structural correction for autocorrelation is not pursued because it could 
introduce specification error and would violate the conditions that allow the input demand functions 
to be integrated back to the cost function. Given the relatively large sample size used in this study, 
the theoretical result that the GMM estimates are asymptotically efficient seems reasonable. 
Two sets of elasticities can be computed from the restricted cost function and the input 
demand functions. The elasticities of demand holding levels of the quasi-fixed factors are equivalent 
to short-run elasticities often defined in the literature. Given that we are estimating a separable cost 
sub-function holding capital and labor fixed, this study uses the term partial adjustment for these 
elasticities, which are reported in Table 5.6
                                                 
6 Using annual data on installed capacity and monthly estimates of replacement costs for new capacity, we generated 
monthly time series for capital stocks. Likewise, using quarterly data for employment levels in the electric 
generating and transmission sector and quarterly data on wages, we generated price and quantities for labor. We then 
estimated a model using (4) and (5) with carbon, labor, and energy as variable inputs and non-carbon energy and 
capital as quasi-fixed inputs. The test of the overidentifying restrictions was decisively rejected, suggesting that the 
extrapolated data could be introducing measurement errors.  This finding verifies our approach to base our analysis 
on reported data, which admittedly can only allow measurement of the short-run flexibility of the power grid to 
switch generation sources in response to relative prices and output. 
  The demands for carbon permits and fuels are essentially 
perfectly inelastic assuming levels of nuclear, hydroelectric, and renewable resources are fixed. In 
some sense, these elasticities are an artifact of this extremely restrictive ceteris paribus measurement 
and would explain the violation of the concavity conditions for these partial adjustment elasticities. 
Nonetheless, the other elasticities reported in Table 5 show that greater levels of nuclear and 
renewable resources reduce the demands for fuels and carbon, as one would expect. Indeed, the 
convexity conditions are satisfied for all observations. Likewise, predicted marginal cost is positive  
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for all observations. Moreover, the marginal cost function shifts upward with rising carbon and fuel 
prices and downward with more nuclear generation.  
The full adjustment elasticities allow the levels of quasi-fixed factors to change. These 
elasticities result from solving the envelope conditions for the quasi-fixed factors and differentiating 
these functions to obtain the elasticities. These derivations appear in Appendix A. The estimated full 
adjustment elasticities appear in Table 6. Overall, they reflect very inelastic factor demands. The 
demand for carbon permits is very inelastic with an own price elasticity of   -0.068 indicating that 
ceteris paribus a 10 percent increase in carbon permit prices results in less than a one percent 
reduction in carbon use.  This inelasticity reflects significant complementarity between carbon 
emissions and fuels. While nuclear and renewable energy are substitutes with carbon permits, the 
cross price elasticities indicated very limited substitution. For example, a 10 percent reduction in the 
price of renewable energy induces slightly less than a 2 percent drop in carbon emissions.  
The output elasticities are all positive as expected with the natural gas output elasticity at more 
than 3, reflecting the well-known role of gas in leveling peaks and troughs in seasonal demand. The 
output elasticity of carbon permits is also significant at more than 2, suggesting that demand side 
reductions, if they can be achieved, would substantially reduce the demand for carbon emissions.  
The marginal cost elasticities are also all significant. The estimated carbon price elasticity of 
marginal cost is 0.211 (see Table 6), indicating that for every 10 percent increase in carbon prices, 
the marginal generation cost of electricity increases by 2 percent. If fuel prices increase with carbon 
prices, the sum of the carbon and fuel price marginal cost elasticities (see Table 6) suggest that for 
every 10 percent increase in carbon prices, the marginal cost of electricity could increase 8 percent.7
                                                 
7 A markup pricing model was also estimated in which two additional estimating equations were added to equations 
(4) and (5), a demand for electricity and a price markup over marginal cost equation derived by assuming electric 
utilities are engage in monopoly pricing. The estimated price elasticities of demand holding output fixed are very 
similar to the results presented above. The elasticities in this context, which allows for endogenous output and 
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The last set of elasticities is the Morishima elasticities of substitution, which are a unit-less 
measure of substitution. The analysis by Blackorby and Russell (1989) proves that the Morishima 
elasticity is a superior measure of substitution for this study because it provides a clear distinction 
between substitutions induced by carbon permit prices versus other input price changes. Morishima 
elasticities are defined as follows: 
 








−∂ln xi xj ( )
∂lnwi
.  (6) 
These elasticities measure the curvature of an isoquant, or the percentage change in a factor input 
ratio for a given percentage change in price, holding all other factor prices constant. As the above 
equation illustrates, the effect of varying wi on the factor input ratio, 
 
xi xj , is composed of two 
parts – the effect of  wi on  xiand the effect of  wi on 
 
xj. Blackorby and Russell [7] show that these 
elasticities are inherently asymmetric.  
The estimated Morishima elasticities of substitution appear in Table 7. All but four of these 20 
substitution elasticities are significant at the five percent level. On the other hand, all of them are less 
than one. For instance, the ratio of nuclear resources to carbon emissions rises 0.852 percent for 
every percent increase in carbon emission prices. In contrast, the ratio of renewable generation to 
carbon emissions increases only 0.345 percent for each percent change in carbon emission prices. 
This suggests that nuclear energy serves as an important swing fuel in meeting carbon emission 
constraints.  
Finally, there is significant complementarity between carbon emissions and high carbon fuels 
when the prices for the latter increase but a small an insignificant response of carbon emission 
                                                                                                                                                             
prices, are very complicated and at this juncture of this research would obscure our focus on technological change 
and substitution. Nevertheless, this approach may merit future investigation.  
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relative to high carbon fuel consumption as carbon emission permits change. This reflects the very 
limited reductions in high carbon fuel consumption in response to carbon permit prices during the 
first phase of the EU ETS. Overall, the Morishma elasticities reflect very limited price-induced 
substitution between alternative generation fuels in the production of electricity in the short-run. 
7. Conclusions 
This study provides an analysis of the underlying economic forces inducing adjustments in electricity 
production factor intensities during the first phase of the European Union’s Emissions Trading 
System regulating emissions of greenhouse gas emissions. Our empirical analysis examines the 
demand for carbon permits, carbon based fuels, and carbon-free energy for 12 European countries 
using monthly data on fuel use, prices, and electricity generation. Our empirical model is unique 
because it considers all possible sources of generation within one model. Heretofore, empirical 
models of factor substitution in electric power generation were confined to studies of steam power 
generation using combustible fuels apart from nuclear of hydroelectric generation because prices for 
the latter fuels are not observable. Our approach uses a restricted variable cost function treating 
these factors as quasi-fixed to estimate the shadow value of these resources. 
Our results suggest several conclusions. Perhaps the most important finding is that very limited 
substitution possibilities in combination with low carbon permit prices may explain the limited 
success of the EU ETS in achieving carbon emission reductions in the electric power generation 
sector. While our empirical results demonstrate that switching to nuclear and renewable energy is 
induced by higher carbon permit prices, the extent of this substitution is limited. Other substitution 
possibilities are also very limited. These results suggest that the current configuration of electricity 
generating assets is inflexible and that to achieve substantial reductions in carbon emissions more 
flexibility must be introduced, most likely from significant investments in new generation capacity.    19 
A second implication of the model is that the effects of the cap on electricity prices can be 
significant, if fuel prices increase together with carbon permit prices as is likely. In this case, our 
estimates suggest that for every 10 percent rise in carbon and fuel prices, the marginal cost of 
electric power generation increases by 8 percent in the short-run. Consequently, if EUA allocations 
are fixed and fuel prices exogenous, the degree to which the costs of a carbon cap are passed on to 
consumers in the short run will be determined by how open the system is to alternative carbon 
offset, such as CERs, and the relative price of those allowances. 
The European experience points to the importance of starting early down a low-carbon path. 
Because fixed investments in power generation are long-lived and irreversible, inflexibilities resulting 
from past investments will be long-lived as well. Consequently, it is important for countries that do 
not currently cap greenhouse gas emissions but hope to promote growth that is less carbon intensive 
to find alternative polices that consider the costs of future adjustments.  
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Table 1: Average annual electric power generation by type and net imports in gigawatt hours, January 2002 
to March 2008 
Country  Fossil 
Fuel  Nuclear  Hydroelectric  Renewables  Indigenous 
Production  Net Imports  Total  
Austria  1,921  0  2,969  96  4,985  372  5,358 
Denmark  2,732  0  2  529  3,263  -246  3,017 
Finland  3,479  1,837  1,041  14  6,371  739  7,109 
France  4,856  35,470  5,164  176  45,666  -4,268  41,398 
Germany  30,428  12,734  2,207  2,255  47,624  -694  46,930 
Greece  4,061  0  400  105  4,566  251  4,817 
Netherlands  7,454  311  8  185  7,958  1,249  9,207 
Portugal  2,777  0  827  168  3,773  418  4,190 
Spain  13,636  4,846  2,592  1,607  22,681  -182  22,499 
Poland  11,480  0  290  20  11,790  -629  11,161 
Sweden  1,075  5,645  5,315  82  12,117  112  12,229 
United Kingdom  24,784  6,022  646  255  31,706  493  32,199 
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Table 2: Average Annual Fossil fuel consumption in terajoules, January 2002 to March 2008 
Country  Coal  Petroleum  Natural Gas 
Austria  4,348  529  6,096 
Denmark  15,192  1,628  3,382 
Finland  6,140  971  6,930 
France  18,236  1,390  2,572 
Germany  107,066  2,654  44,666 
Greece  7  6,991  6,779 
Netherlands  21,346  57  24,951 
Portugal  11,041  2,625  5,813 
Spain  57,891  13,329  25,930 
Poland  77,898  8  3,103 
Sweden  698  526  252 
United Kingdom  102,979  4,510  100,373 
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Figure 2: Shares of natural gas in fossil fuel use in power generation by country, 2004 to 2007 
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Table 3: Generalized Method of Moments Estimates 
Parameter  Estimate  t-ratio  P-value    Parameter  Estimate  t-ratio  P-value 
δ1
1  0.006  0.0  [.965]    δ6
3  -4.158  -3.7  [.000] 
δ2
1   -0.308  -2.7  [.008]    δ7
3  2.796  1.5  [.141] 
δ3
1  -0.522  -3.1  [.002]    δ8
3  -1.315  -1.5  [.134] 
δ4
1   1.199  2.3  [.021]    δ9
3  -0.304  -0.1  [.928] 
δ5
1   0.696  1.8  [.070]    δ10
3   -31.870  -11.1  [.000] 
δ6
1   -1.346  -9.7  [.000]    δ11
3   -0.441  -0.2  [.828] 
δ7
1   -1.272  -6.0  [.000]    δ12
3   41.760  9.5  [.000] 
δ8
1   0.027  0.2  [.814]    α11   0.805  13.5  [.000] 
δ9
1   2.092  6.4  [.000]    α12   -0.010  -1.9  [.056] 
δ10
1   -0.188  -0.6  [.572]    α13   0.005  1.0  [.316] 
δ11
1   -0.168  -0.7  [.510]    α22   6.443  13.7  [.000] 
δ12
1   3.129  7.4  [.000]    α23  0.061  1.7  [.081] 
δ1
2  -0.251  -0.2  [.823]    α33  3.426  9.4  [.000] 
δ2
1   1.857  1.6  [.100]    δy1  -0.011  -0.9  [.360] 
δ3
2  -5.368  -3.5  [.001]    δy2  -0.026  -0.7  [.493] 
δ4
2  11.970  2.1  [.033]    δy3  -0.020  -0.7  [.514] 
δ5
2  18.810  4.2  [.000]    γ yy   0.001  1.2  [.228] 
δ6
2  -10.840  -7.9  [.000]    δn1  -0.801  -20.0  [.000] 
δ7
2  -14.840  -6.2  [.000]    δn2   -6.282  -19.0  [.000] 
δ8
2  2.030  1.9  [.055]    δn3  -3.633  -15.2  [.000] 
δ9
2  25.810  7.0  [.000]    δr1  -0.457  -7.9  [.000] 
δ10
2   17.240  4.4  [.000]    δr2   -4.537  -9.2  [.000] 
δ11
2   -0.370  -0.2  [.873]    δr3   0.389  1.0  [.296] 
δ12
2   11.830  2.1  [.038]    γ yn   -0.004  -3.8  [.000] 
δ1
3  2.161  2.0  [.047]    γ yr   -0.010  -4.3  [.000] 
δ2
3  -7.926  -8.5  [.000]    γ nn   0.051  2.3  [.019] 
δ3
3  0.530  0.4  [.680]    γ nr   0.072  3.2  [.002] 
δ4
3  3.874  0.9  [.392]    γ rr   0.161  2.7  [.007] 
δ5
3  -22.080  -4.9  [.000]           
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Variable Cost  331.2  32.90  0.9935  0.6793 
Carbon Permits  4.512  0.5289  0.9888  0.6406 
High Carbon Fuels  38.38  7.217  0.9706  0.6266 
Low Carbon Fuels  21.28  4.968  0.9710  0.5968 
 
 
Table 5: Partial Adjustment Elasticities of Demand and Marginal Cost  (asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses) 
  Carbon 
Price 










Carbon  0.004  -0.009  0.005  -0.899  -0.122  1.720 
  (2.3)  (1.9)  (1.0)  (30.4)  (10.3)  (31.3) 
Coal & Oil  -0.005  -0.012  0.017  -0.906  -0.184  1.745 
  (1.9)  (1.7)  (1.7)  (18.8)  (9.0)  (21.2) 
Natural Gas  0.004  0.019  -0.023  -0.936  0.038  1.807 
  (1.0)  (1.7)  (1.6)  (14.9)  (1.4)  (15.5) 
Marginal Cost  0.258  0.220  0.348  -0.243  -0.029  0.318 
  (12.7)  (31.3)  (21.2)  (37.2)  (10.5)  (15.5) 
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Table 6: Full Adjustment Elasticities of Demand and Marginal Cost (asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses) 
Input  Carbon  
Price 












Carbon  -0.068  -0.119  -0.056  0.052  0.191  2.055 
  (7.7)  (8.6)  (5.6)  (3.6)  (12.2)  (31.2) 
Coal & Oil  -0.082  -0.127  -0.036  0.068  0.177  1.952 
  (7.3)  (7.3)  (2.8)  (3.8)  (10.7)  (20.8) 
Natural Gas  -0.066  -0.061  -0.150  -0.022  0.299  3.067 
  (5.1)  (2.6)  (5.3)  (1.4)  (10.2)  (14.2) 
Nuclear  0.042  0.058  0.054  -0.154  0.000  0.077 
  (12.1)  (13.9)  (12.4)  (16.5)  (2.5)  (17.3) 
Renewable  0.312  0.539  -0.079  0.028  -0.800  0.413 
  (4.8)  (5.7)  (1.1)  (2.5)  (5.0)  (5.2) 
Marginal Cost  0.211  0.338  0.284  0.041  0.009  0.239 




Table 7: Full Adjustment Morishima Elasticities of Substitution 
(asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses) 
Input  Carbon  
Price 








Carbon    -0.014  0.003  0.380  0.110 
    (3.2)  (0.2)  (5.2)  (9.2) 
           
Coal & Oil  0.009    0.066  0.667  0.185 
  (1.8)    (1.9)  (6.2)  (9.1) 
           
Natural Gas  0.094  0.114    0.071  0.204 
  (3.0)  (3.1)    (0.8)  (6.7) 
           
Nuclear  0.852  0.868  0.778    0.801 
  (4.9)  (4.9)  (4.8)    (5.0) 
           
Renewable  0.345  0.331  0.453  0.182   
  (14.0)  (13.3)  (12.3)  (10.0)   
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Appendix A 
Derivation of the Elasticities 
 
This appendix provides the derivations for the restricted and unrestricted elasticities of 
demand and substitution. The derivations all follow from differentiating the following short-run 
restricted cost function: 
 
Gt = Yt
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  (A1) 
The variables are defined in the paper above. The three input demand functions are the partial 
derivatives of the restricted cost function (A1) with respect to input prices: 
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 The marginal cost function is as follows:   31 
∂Gt
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  (A6) 
The conditional input demand elasticity with respect to levels of hydroelectric and nuclear 
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  (A7) 
Likewise, the conditional input demand elasticity with respect to renewable generation is:  
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  (A9) 
The concavity conditions are determined by calculating the Eigen values of the three-by-three 
matrix formed from the partial derivatives of (A1) with respect to input prices. 
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  (A13) 
  The convexity conditions for the quasi-fixed level of hydroelectric and nuclear generation 
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As Morrison (1988) shows, the convexity conditions can be solved, in this case simultaneously, 
for the equilibrium levels of the quasi-fixed inputs. First, consider the solution for equilibrium 
levels of nuclear and hydroelectric generation: 
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where   35 
 
QMt = µnt
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  (A19) 
  The elasticities of demand for these quasi-fixed inputs with respect to carbon and fossil 
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  (A27) 
The partial adjustment elasticities for carbon and energy inputs allow the quasi-fixed 
factors to adjust, at this stage assuming output and prices fixed. The general expressions for these 
full adjustment elasticities of demand are as follows: 
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  (A29) 
and where  Xit
* are the levels of variable inputs at equilibrium levels of the quasi-fixed factors. 
The elasticities of variable input demands with respect to prices for quasi-fixed factors are as 
follows: 
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  (A30) 
Similarly, the partial adjustment output and technological elasticities are defined as follows: 
 









































  (A31) 
  The full adjustment marginal cost elasticities are defined in a similar fashion.  
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  (A32) 
All the full adjustment elasticities are evaluated at the grand mean of the observations. 
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